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THE LEGAL BATTLES OF G.I. JOE:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DISTINCTIVE FINGERNAILS,
ACTION FIGURES, NINJAS AND DISTINGUISHED MARINES
A. JACK GUGGENHEIM*
I. INTRODUCTION
For over three decades, the toy action figure known as G.I. Joe
has added adventure and patriotism to childhood playtime. Over
the years, G.I. Joe has been the subject of both sandbox and legal
battles. The resulting judicial decisions have helped shape and de-
velop American jurisprudence, particularly the area of intellectual
property law. With G.I. Joe gearing up for his thirty-fifth anniver-
sary, and with the introduction of two new books which chronicle
the development of G.I. Joe, now is a good time to examine such
contributions and reflect on the particular lessons Joe's legal battles
can teach. These lessons include the importance of having distinc-
tive fingernails, using best efforts when dealing with Ninjas, the role
of an action figure (as opposed to a doll), and the sale of distin-
guished marines.
II. TmE HISTORY OF G.I. JOE
The longstanding success and widespread popularity of the
G.I. Joe action figure has made it a valuable product worth protect-
ing through litigation. G.I. Joe made his historic debut, courtesy of
Hasbro, in 1964 as an eleven and a half inch plastic toy soldier.1
There has been speculation that the original mold for G.I. Joe's
* B.A., cum laude, Yeshiva University;, J.D., with honors, Columbia University
School of Law. COA, with honors, Parker School of Comparative and Interna-
tional Law. Associate, Sidley & Austin. The views expressed herein represent the
author's alone. This article is for Arye: even though as a kid I chewed up his G.I.
Joes, he continues to be the best brother. This article was further inspired by prior
involvement in the representation of a number of toy manufacturers. For further
articles on intellectual property by the author see A. Jack Guggenheim, KOA is
A.O.K: The Second Circuit's Recent Kosher Trademark Decision Further Illustrates That the
Patent and Trademark Office Must Answer to a Higher Authority, COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTs, Vol. 22, No. 203 (1998); and Tigers, Tornadoes and Titans: Trademark Implica-
tions of Renaming the National Football League Oilers, 76 U. DET. MERcv L. REv. 45
(Fall 1998).
1. See The G.L Joe Chronology, (visited Jan. 12, 1998) <http://www.hasbrotoys.
com/gijoe/chron.html>; see alsoJoHN MICHUIG, G.I. JoE: THE COMPLETE STORY OF
AMERICA'S FAVORITE MAN OF ACTION, Chronicle (1998); G. WAYNE MILLER, Toy
WARS: THE Epic STRuGGLE BETWEEN G.I. JOE, BARBIE, AND THE COMPANIES THAT
MAKE THEM (Time Books 1998);JAMEs DESIMONE, OFFIcIAL COLLECrOR's GUIDE TO
(15)
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face was modeled after PresidentJohn F. Kennedy's facial features. 2
In 1968, the G.I. Joe line significantly expanded when it introduced
talking figures.3 In 1969, the G.I. Joe line included soldiers from all
branches of the United States armed service. 4 In 1970, Hasbro cre-
ated the "G.I. Joe Adventure Team," which included four special
G.I. Joes.5 In 1974, stores introduced the first G.I. Joes with "kung-
fu grips." In 1975, children marveled at the Atomic Man, the first
bionic G.I. Joe, which was followed by the "Eagle Eye Joe," the ac-
tion figure with movable eyes.6 Both "SuperJoe," an eight inch Joe
with laser lights, and G.I. Joe with a "1-2 punch," hit the market in
1977. 7 In 1978, Hasbro discontinued its marketing of G.I. Joe after
the price of petroleum, a major component of plastics, increased
substantially.8
This setback, however, was temporary. G.I. Joe was reborn in
1982 as a three and three-fourths inch "Real American Hero."9 The
initial smaller G.I. Joe line consisted of 16 action figures with
molded uniforms, sophisticated weapons and vehicles, and detailed
bios. 10 The reintroduction of the action figure came with a Marvel
comic book of G.I. Joe assignments and adventures.1
In subsequent years, as the toy became more popular, Hasbro
expanded its line to include "Cobra," G.I. Joe's terrorist adver-
sary.12 In 1986, G.I. Joe was ranked the best selling toy in America
by Toy & Hobby WorU 13 By 1989, G.I. Joe's 25th birthday, Hasbro
incorporated two American athletes in its G.I. Joe line, the wrestler
COLLECTING AND COMPLETING YOUR G.I. JoE FIGURES AND ACCESSORIES, BOOKs 1
AND 2 (1980).
2. See Megan Garvey, The GI. Joe Brigade/A Salute to America's Collectors, Young
and Old, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 30, 1997, at El. Others have
posited that Joe's face is a composite of 20 Medal of Honor winners. See id.
3. See The G.I. Joe Chronology, supra note 1. See also JEFF KIL AN AND CHARLES
GRIFFITH, TOMART'S PRICE GUIDE TO G.I. JOE COLLECTIBLES (1985).
4. See The G.I Joe Chronology, supra note 1. In addition, Hasbro introduced
soldier action figures from foreign armed services in 1969. See id.
5. See id. See also G.L Joe-A Real American FAQ (visited Jan. 12, 1998) <www.
yojoe.com/gifag.txt>.
6. See The G.I. Joe Chronology, supra note 1. 1976 also saw the introduction of
"Bulletman," the "Intruders," and the "Defenders." See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See The G.I. Joe Chronology, supra note 1.
11. See id. The G.I. Joe comic had a successful 12 year run, covering 155 issues
and spending many months as one of the top selling comic books in the country.
See G.L Joe-A Real American FAQ supra note 5.
12. See The G. Joe Chronology, supra note 1.
13. See id.
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"Sgt. Slaughter" and Chicago Bears' William "Refrigerator" Perry.1 4
In 1991, the first twelve-inch figure since the 1970's hit the toy
stores in a limited market test, and the entire shipment of 80,000
figures sold out in the first weekend. 15 By 1993, children across the
world had purchased over 250,000,000 G.I. Joe figures and
115,000,000 G.I. Joe vehicles. 16 G.I. Joe's stunning success also gen-
erated a need for legal protection.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINCTIVE FINGERNAILS
In Hassenfeld Bros., Inc. v. Mego Corp.,17 the plaintiff, Hassenfeld
Bros. (hereafter, "Hassenfeld"), Hasbro's predecessor, sued Mego
Corp. (hereinafter "Mego"), its competitor, for the alleged copy-
right infringement of G.I. JOE.1 8 Hassenfeld owned a valid and
subsisting copyright in G.I. JOE, evidenced by Certificate of Regis-
tration No. GP 41527.19 The sole issue before the court was
whether Hassenfeld was entitled to injunctive relief because of the
defendant's activities in selling and promoting an alleged piratical
copy of G.I. JOE, called "FIGHTING YANK."20 The court found
that both toys were military figures, approximately eleven inches in
height, with removable clothing and accessories.21 The court fur-
ther found that G.I. JOE was the culmination of considerable effort
in design which resulted in the sale of more than seven million
figures after its introduction in 1964.22
The court noted that FIGHTING YANK and G.I. JOE shared
similar clothing, accessories and respective packaging. 23 Specifi-
cally, the court found features similar between the figures' heads,
torsos, legs, hands, arms and other extremities. 24 The most signifi-
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. 150 U.S.P.Q. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
18. See id. Hasbro, incorporated in Rhode Island, is the world's largest toy
manufacturing company with 1986 revenues of over $1.3 billion. See Hasbro, Inc.
v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1988). Since 1983, Hasbro has spent
over $65 million to promote its "G.I. JOE" line. See id. Sales of the "G.I. JOE" line
in 1986 amounted to $170 million, approximately 13 percent of Hasbro's total
sales for that year. See id. at 72. For a discussion of copyright law within a military
law context, see William V. Adams, Avoiding the Use of Copyrighted Music in Audiovi-
sual Works, 1988-AUG ARMY LAw. 43 (1988).
19. See Hassenfeld Bros., 150 U.S.P.Q. at 787.
20. See id. at 786.
21. See id. at 787.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 788.
24. See Hassenfeld Bros., 150 U.S.P.Q. at 788.
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cant similarity in the court's view was a uniquely placed right
thumbnail which both G.I. JOE and the FIGHTING YANK pos-
sessed.25 The court found that this anatomically incorrect finger-
nail could not have been the result of independent creation, but
was in all likelihood the result of copying.26 The court concluded
that Hassenfeld was entitled to injunctive relief preventing Mego
from marketing its product because Hassenfeld would likely be able
to substantiate its claim of copyright infringement.2 7 Furthermore,
the court held that Mego's conduct caused and would continue to
cause irreparable damage to Hassenfeld.28 Lastly, the court held
that Hassenfeld would likely be able to prove a substantial similarity
between the plaintiffs copyrighted work and the defendant's al-
leged copy at trial.29 Joe's unique fingernail had saved the day.
IV. AurION FIGURE v. DoLL
In Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. United States,30 Hasbro appealed the
decision of the Court of International Trade, which held that "G.I.
Joe Action Figures" were within the common meaning of "dolls"
and were properly classified under Item 737.24 of the Tariff Sched-
ules of the United States (TSUS). 31 Affirming the lower court's de-
cision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
agreed that Joe was in fact a doll.3 2
Joe's classification became an issue when the United States
Customs Service classified "G.I. Joe Action Figures," imported from
Hong Kong during 1982 and 1983, as "other dolls" under Item
737.24 of the TSUS.33 Under this classification, varying rates of
duty applied.3 4 Hasbro argued that G.I. Joe should be exempt from
such duty because they were properly classifiable as toy figures of
25. See id. at 787.
26. See i&
27. See id. at 789.
28. See id.; see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Co., 302 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.
1962) (granting preliminary injunction on factual finding of similarity and prob-
able copying). But see Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966)
(refusing to grant preliminary injunction although dolls had same size, shape and
features) .
29. See Hassenfeld Bros., 150 U.S.P.Q. at 786.
30. 879 F.2d 838 (Fed. Cir. 1989), affg703 F. Supp 941 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 839.
34. See id.
[Vol. 6: p. 15
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animate objects.3 5 The Court of International Trade disagreed, us-
ing lexicographic authorities and prior case law to establish that the
G.I. Joe action figure fell within the common meaning of the term
"doll."3 6
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that to determine the
common meaning of a tariff term like "doll," the court "may consult
dictionaries, scientific authorities, and other reliable information
sources to ascertain that common meaning."37 The Court of Inter-
national Trade referred to a general dictionary defining the word
"doll" as a representation of a human being used as a child's play-
thing. The Federal Circuit concluded that this summary definition
was suitable for the dispute. 38
Given this broad common meaning for the term "doll," the
Federal Circuit next reviewed whether the Court of International
Trade clearly erred when it found that the G.I. Joe action figure fit
within that term.39 It determined that the Court of International
Trade did not clearly err and concluded that the Court of Interna-
tional Trade had relied on, inter alia, expert testimony, magazine
articles referring to G.I. Joe as a doll, letters from purchasers to
Hasbro which referred to G.I. Joe as a doll, doll collector books and
the figures themselves. 40 Furthermore, the Court of International
Trade surmised that the individual personality of each of the G.I.
Joe figures, evidenced by his or her biographical file cards and
physical characteristics, invited "intimate and manipulative" play.
These unique attributes indicated that these figures were not com-
parable to the "identical, immobile faceless toy soldiers of yester-
year that were sold in groups of a dozen or so in bags," and were
classified as toy figures.41 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found
that G.I. Joe figures were dolls and thus were subject to a U.S. duty.
35. See Hasbro, 879 F.2d at 839. Under Item A737.40 of the TSUS, non-stuffed
toy figures of animate objects without spring mechanisms, excluding dolls, are ex-
empt from duty. See id.
36. See id. at 841.
37. Id. at 840. See also C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. v. United States, 673
F.2d 1268, 1271 (C.C.PA. 1982); United States v. Cody Manufacturing Co., 44
C.C.P.A. 67, 73-74 (1957). See generally Russ Berrie & Co. v. United States, 417 F.
Supp. 1035, 1039 (Cust. Ct. 1976) ("A doll for tariff purposes is not confined to
playthings for children but includes .. . dolls for ornamentation .... souvenir or
prize dolls, dolls for display or advertising purposes, and dolls sold as gag items,
bar gadgets, adult novelties, etc.").
38. See Hasbro Industries, 879 F.2d at 840.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 941, 946 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988).
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Interestingly, the Federal Circuit offered G.I. Joe a few words of
encouragement, stating "[e]ven though G.I. Joe has lost this battle,
hopefully he will not lose his courage for combat, despite being
officially designated by the United States Customs Service as a
doll. '42 This questionable decision notwithstanding, Hasbro still
encourages consumers and collectors to continue to call G.I. Joe an
"action figure" instead of a doll. 43
V. DISTINGUISHED MARINES
In Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd.(Lanard), Hasbro, which
used the name "GUNG-HO" to describe a marine action figure in
the G.I. Joe action figure line, brought a trademark action against a
competitor that used the term "GUNG-HO!" to describe an entire
line of action figures similar to the G.I. Joe line. 44 The central issue
in Lanard was whether "GUNG-HO" warranted federal protection
under the Lanham Act as a descriptive or suggestive mark.45
On August 20, 1987 Hasbro commenced an action in the New
York State Supreme Court (New York County) alleging common
law unfair competition, which was later removed to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.46 Has-
bro, having been denied its motion for preliminary injunction to
prevent Lanard from marketing its "Gung-Ho!" action figure line by
the district court, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.47
After examining the G.I. Joe line, the Second Circuit, demon-
strating a sense of humor, concluded that members of G.I. Joe were
"the toughest 'characters' ever to appear in court."48 The court fur-
ther noted that the outcome of the litigation could not be deter-
mined by pitting Lanard's "Large Sarge," with his bazooka and
ability to be "[e]xtremely cool and competent under deadly pres-
sure," against Hasbro's "GUNG-HO" action figure, with his dress
saber and ability to "low-crawl through the nastiest black-water,
42. See Hasbro Industries, 879 F.2d at 841.
43. See Garvey, supra note 2, at El.
44. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd. (Lanard), 858 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1988).
45. See id.
t 46, See id. at 72. On August 26, Lanard successfully petitioned for the action
to be removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). See id.
47. See id. at 72. Hasbro subsequently amended its complaint without objec-
tion to assert a claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1982), and to bring a motion for preliminary injunction. See id.
48. Id. at 71.
[Vol. 6: p. 15
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stinking mud and bubbling slime."49 Instead, it was necessary to
determine whether Hasbro's unregistered "GUNG-HO" mark was
protectible under the Lanham Act, by assessing its strength and
evaluating the likelihood of confusion between the Hasbro "GUNG-
HO" mark and the Lanard "GUNG-HO" mark.50
From 1983 to 1985, Hasbro sold "Ettienne R. LaFitte," code
name "GUNG-HO," a G.I. Joe figure with a machine gun and
backpack.5 1 Hasbro reintroduced "GUNG-HO" in its 1987 "G.I.
JOE" action figure series. The 1987 figure, distinct from the earlier
one, appeared in full dress marine uniform. 52 The "GUNG-HO"
action figure was a top seller. In 1983, 1,250,000 figures were
shipped, and by 1988 it had shipped close to another two million
GUNG-HO figures. 53 Like Hasbro's "G.I. JOE" action figures, the
action figures sold by Lanard were 3-3/4 inches tall with jointed
arms and legs, and each figure had its own name and biography. 54
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Hasbro had to demon-
strate irreparable harm and either: (1) likelihood of success on the
merits; or (2) sufficiently serious questions about the merits to
make them fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.55 In a
Lanham Act case, a showing of likelihood of confusion establishes
both a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm,
assuming that the plaintiff has a protectible mark.56
The first question to be resolved was whether Hasbro's unregis-
tered mark was entitled to protection under the Lanham Act. The
four categories that measure the degree of protection that a mark
merits are, in ascending order of protection, generic, descriptive,
suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful. 57 The stronger the mark the
more likely it is protected by the Lanham Act. The central issue on
49. See Lanard, 858 F.2d at 71.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 72.
52. See id. at 71.
53. See id. at 72.
54. See Lanard, 858 F.2d at 72-73.
55. SeeJackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.
1979) (per curiam); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 78-79
(2d Cir. 1981) (holding Jackson Dairy standard applies where preliminary injunc-
tion is sought for trademark infringement violations).
56. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel Inc., 832 F.2d
1311, 1314 (2d Cir. 1987); Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683
F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982); Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co.,
451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971).
57. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
1999]
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Hasbro's appeal to the Second Circuit was whether Hasbro's
"GUNG-HO" was a descriptive or suggestive mark. A term is sugges-
tive if it requires "imagination, thought and perception to reach a
conclusion with respect to the nature of goods."58 Generally, if a
term is suggestive it is entitled to trademark protection even with-
out proof of "secondary meaning," or recognition as a strong
mark.59 A term is "descriptive" if it conveys an idea of the "ingredi-
ents, qualities or characteristics of the goods," or if it describes the
use to which a product is put.60 Generally, an unregistered descrip-
tive mark is only accorded trademark protection when secondary
meaning is established.61
The United States adopted "GUNG-HO" as a motto during the
World War II era.62 The Second Circuit found that "[i] t takes some
imagination.., to intuit a swamp-crawling, leech-sucked, bug-bitten
marine Sergeant from the term 'GUNG-HO.' "63 Consequently, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that "GUNG-HO"
was suggestive of a marine, and held that Hasbro's mark was enti-
tled to Lanham Act protection. 64
The court ignored whether Lanard's sale of "Gung-Ho!" action
figures caused "an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent pur-
chasers ... to be misled or ... confused about the source of the
goods in question." 65 In order to determine whether such a "likeli-
58. See Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), quoted in Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11. If "there is an
imaginative factor connecting the name and the product," the name is suggestive.
Information Clearing House, Inc. v. Find Magazine, 492 F. Supp. 147, 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Or Da Indus., Ltd. v. Leisure Learning Prods., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 710, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("BRAINY BLOCKS" suggests game with geometric
tile pieces resembling blocks that requires child's cognitive skills). In the publish-
ing field, the term "PLAYBOY" is a suggestive term, and even though it "may signify
the aspirations of PLAYBOYs readership, it does not describe the product or its
contents." Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g. Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 566-67
(2d Cir. 1982). In another context, a court held that "PASSION" perfume was a
suggestive mark since, " [i]nstead of describing the product, it describes an emo-
tion the fragrance seeks to induce. Connecting the emotion to the fragrance re-
quires 'an effort of the imagination.'" Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick
Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp. 1238, 124344 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
59. See Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1985).
60. See Stix Prod., 295 F. Supp. at 488, cited in Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at
11; see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985);
Thompson Med., 753 F.2d at 216; 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc.,
747 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1984) (adopting Stix Products test).
61. See Thompson Med., 753 F.2d at 216; 20th Century Wear, 747 F.2d at 87.
62. See Lanard, 858 F.2d at 73.
63. Id. at 74.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 75 (quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F. 2d
41, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)).
[Vol. 6: p. 15
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hood of confusion" existed, the court applied the test enumerated
by Judge Friendly in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.66 This
multi-factor balancing test considers: (1) the strength of the plain-
tiff's mark; (2) the similarity between the two marks; (3) the prox-
imity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the reciprocal of the de-
fendant's good faith in adopting its own mark; (7) the quality of
defendant's product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.67
The first factor, the strength of the senior user's mark, analyzes
the relationship between goods sold with a mark and identification
of its source. 68 The second factor, the degree of similarity between
the marks, focuses on whether the similarity "is likely to create con-
fusion."69 The third factor addresses whether, due to the commer-
cial proximity of the competitive products, consumers may be
confused as to their source. 70 This confusion can occur if consum-
ers mistakenly assume that one manufacturer's toys are associated
with, or made by, the other manufacturer. 7' The fourth factor ex-
amines the likelihood that the senior user of the mark will enter the
junior user's market. 72 This factor was not an issue in Lanard since
plaintiff and defendant already competed in the same market.73
The fifth factor asks whether there is any actual confusion.74 In
Lanard, however, the absence of actual confusion was not thought
to be relevant since Lanard's product had only been on the market
for a short time.75 The sixth factor assesses whether the junior user
acted in bad faith in adopting its mark.76 In its analysis of the sev-
enth factor, the quality of the junior user's product, the court
agreed with the lower court's decision "that Lanard's international
security figures were not of lesser quality than Hasbro's military ac-
tion figures."77 Finally, in analyzing the last factor, the court rea-
soned that the sophistication of the consumers is based upon the
66. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
67. See id. at 495; see also Centaur Communications Ltd. v. A/S/M Communi-
cations, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1225 (2d Cir. 1987).
68. See Lanard, 858 F.2d at 76.
69. Id. at 77.
70. See Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1226.
71. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 874 (2d
Cir. 1986).
72. Lanard, 858 F.2d at 78.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Lanard, 858 F.2d at 78.
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assertion that unsophisticated buyers increase the chances for con-
fusion.78 Here, the court found that there was not enough evi-
dence to reach a determination on this factor. 79 After balancing all
the factors, the court determined that due to the strength of Has-
bro's mark, the degree of similarity between Hasbro's and Lanard's
marks, their indisputable competitive proximity, and the lack of any
differentiation in consumer markets, there was a likelihood of con-
fusion and irreparable harm.80 Hence, the Second Circuit reversed
the district court's order and remanded for entry of a preliminary
injunction. 81 In sum, G.I. Joe emerged victorious because the Sec-
ond Circuit found that "GUNG-HO" was suggestive of a marine.
VI. BEST EFFORTS DEFEAT NINJAS
Hasbro, Inc. v. Child's Play Int'l Corp. 82 involved an action arising
from a license to manufacture and market a line of ninja action
figure toys.8 3 The dispute started in 1987, when Hasbro Inc., ("Has-
bro") erroneously paid a duplicate licensing fee to Child's Play In-
ternational Corporation ("Child's Play").8 4 After discovering its
mistake, Hasbro brought suit to recover duplicate payment.8 5
Child's Play counterclaimed, asserting "that Hasbro failed to exploit
its exclusive license diligently, adequately and effectively in accord-
ance with [its contractual] obligations."8 6 On a motion for sum-
mary judgment, Hasbro moved to dismiss the amended
counterclaims, arguing that Child Play's discovery did not produce
sufficient evidence to conclude that Hasbro's exploitation of the
license was insufficient.87
In 1985, Child's Play acquired a line of seven ninja warrior ac-
tion figures ("Ninja Warriors") that enjoyed significant popularity
in the spring of 1986. To maximize the line's popularity, Child's
Play approached Hasbro, a company with more experience and
78. See id. at 78-79.
79. See id. at 79.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 79. For a further discussion of this case, see PatrickJ. Corcoran,
Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd.: G.I. Joe Emerges from the Trademark Wars Victorious
but Second Circuit Continues Search for Appropriate Scope of Review, 63 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 97 (1988).
82. No. 87 Civ. 4613, 1991 WL 156282, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1991) (Child's
Play).
83. See id at *1.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See 3 Child's Play, 1991 WL 156282, at *1.
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greater resources, and offered to license the Ninja Warrior action
figures to them.8 In the past, Hasbro had manufactured several
ninja figures as part of its G.I. Joe merchandise, but never devoted
an entire line to such figures. 89 Hasbro was interested in the Ninja
Warriors, and the parties negotiated and executed an agreement
(the "Agreement").90 The Agreement gave Hasbro the right to
manufacture items similar to the Ninja Warrior line.91 Hasbro
thereafter undertook efforts to develop, manufacture and promote
the Ninja Warrior line, including the filming of a television com-
mercial.92 Unfortunately, consumers lost interest in ninja action
figures and Hasbro elected to abandon its Ninja Warrior television
campaign. 93 For this and other related reasons, Child's Play alleged
in its counterclaim that Hasbro made insufficient efforts to market
the Ninja Warrior line as industry-wide standards required.9 4
The court examined the language of the contract between
Child's Play and Hasbro and concluded that, at most, it imposed a
"best efforts" requirement on Hasbro.95 The court noted however,
that a best efforts obligation did not require Hasbro to "slavishly...
devote its efforts to marketing the [Ninja Warriors] line."9 6 After
examining the facts, the court concluded that Hasbro did not vio-
late the Agreement with Child's Play.97 According to the court,
Child's Play failed to produce evidence that could lead a fact finder
to reasonably conclude that Hasbro's actions in promoting the
Ninja Warriors were inadequate. 98 The court therefore granted
Hasbro's motion for summary judgment.99
VII. THE FIGHT CONTINUES ...
As G.I. Joe grows older, fan loyalty grows as well. Various col-
lectors' groups have sprung up and G.I. Joe has appeared in many
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at *2.
91. See id.
92. See Child's Play, 1991 WL 156282, at *2.
93. See id at *4.
94. See id. at *6.
95. See id.
96. Id. See also Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing
Co., 281 N.E.2d 142, 145 (1972) ("[L]icensees are not deemed to limit themselves
in their usual business enterprise to the promotion of the licensor's product, ab-
sent specific agreement to this effect; and an agreement to use due diligence or
best efforts does not alone limit their activity to the licensor's interests.").
97. See Child's Play, 1991 WL 156282, at *7.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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museum and library exhibits. 100 In addition, various publications
dedicated to collecting G.I. Joe have emerged, including the Master
Collector newsletter, which has a circulation of over 20,000.101
With this increased popularity, the alleged use of G.I. Joe's likeness
without permission has also increased. For example, a G.I. Joe
manufacturer recently sued Nissan Motor Co. for its commercial
featuring a doll that resembled G.I. Joe driving a red Nissan toy
convertible with a Barbie-like doll, leaving behind a dejected Ken-
like doll.10 2
G.I. Joe also recently declared war on "G.I. Battledress," a com-
pany that manufactures toy uniforms and weapons and bills itself as
providing "historically accurate uniforms for the serious G.I. Joe
collector."103 Hasbro filed suit alleging that G.I. Battledress vio-
lated Hasbro's trademarks by advertising unlicensed G.I. Joe gear
on the Internet.1 0 4 While the outcome of these lawsuits is uncer-
tain, G.I. Joe's legacy is not. He continues to provide many chil-
dren with adventure, an outlet for creativity, a sense of patriotism
and, to future legal scholars, the prospect of G.I. Joe legal analysis
in our rich American jurisprudence. 10 5
100. See Kristie Hanley, Collector Is a Warrior in His Hunt for G.I. Joe Military
Memorabilia Display Shows Doll's Many Faces, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ),July 1997, at
1, available in 1997 WL 12542354.
101. See Garvey, supra note 2, at El.
102. See Mattel Sues Nissan Over Ad Featuring Barbie Look-Alike, THE FRESNO BEE,
Sept. 22, 1997, at Cl; Nancy Rivera Brooks, Barbie's Online Critics See Guise in Doll's
Toys: Puerto Rican Incarnation Is at Center of Latest Mattel Brouhaha. First, the Hair...,
LA. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at D1.
103. Jacqueline Soteropoulos, G.I Joe Marches Off to Court, TAMPA TRIBUNE,
Mar. 19, 1997, at 1.
104. See id.
105. For other articles that examine the role of toys within the legal context,
see Theresa A. Charters, Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.: Confusing
"Play" on Words Costs "Dough"for Rose Art, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 271 (1994); Stuffed Toy
Dog Did Not Infringe Rival, 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 39 (1993). For a more serious
discussion of the intersection of toys, jurisprudence, and society, see Andrea
Weinerman, Note, The Use and Misuse of Anatomically Correct Dolls in Child Sexual
Abuse Evaluations: Uncovering Fact ... or Fantasy?, 16 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 347
(1995); Michael A. Pangelinan, Lives Lost to the Overseas Toy Industry: A Call for Ac-
tion, 16 Loy. L.A. IrNT'L & COMP. L.J. 735 (1994); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the
Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissoci-
ation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67 (1993).
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